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of supplying each class; and (3) competitive adequacy: rates should be de-
signed to promote and hold the business. Mr. Welch notes that the tendency
has been toward rate simplification, and he observes that rate design is the
function of utility management, but he also says that the reasonableness of any
proposed rate must be susceptible of demonstration. In brief, there may still
be some virtue in that favorite of the bad old days, "Take the most feathers
from the goose with the least squawk ;" but even the squawkless goose now
gets a substantial measure of regulatory protection.
Mr. Welch's book belongs in the office of every utility executive whose
company may be subjected to the rigors of rate case procedure; in the library
of every utility lawyer, for its insights into the whole regulatory problem, as
well as its sound, practical rate case suggestions; and on the desk of the head
of every utility rate department or division. It deserves to be perused, pon-
dered, studied. More profitable reading for the gentlemen indicated could not
well be imagined. A. J. G. PRIESTt
STUDIES IN FEDERALISM. Edited by R. R. Bowie & C. J. Friedrich. Boston:
Little Brown & Co., 1954. Pp. xlii, 887. $15.
FEDERALISM, IATURE AND EIERGENT. Edited by Arthur AV. Macmahon.
New York: Doubleday, 1955. Pp. xi, 557. $7.50.
BOTH these composite volumes represent the keen American interest of the
last few years in the possibility of applying the notion of federalism to the
problems of Western Europe. The Studies prepared under the direction of
Professors Bowie and Friedrich were mainly done in the period July-October
1952 on behalf of a Committee of the European Movement. Upon these studies
were based resolutions relating to a European constitution which in turn were
adopted in November 1952 by the Committee of the European Movement.
This Committee's work paralleled rather than inspired the work undertaken
by the so-called Ad Hoe Assembly, itself an outcrop of the Schuman Plan
organization, which produced early in 1953 a "Draft Treaty Embodying the
Statute of the European Community," printed like the resolutions as an ap-
pendix to this volume.
The Studies themselves deal with the general theme of federalism, partly
under the heading of institutions, partly under that of functions, and partly in
the light of particular problems such as overseas territories and constitutional
amendment. In each case the method adopted is the same: to examine how
the subject is handled in the existing "classic" federations, the United States,
Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Germany (in its Imperial, Weimar and
Bonn phases), with occasional reference to Austria; and then to see what
lessons can be drawn for a federation designed in the first instance for the
Schuman Plan countries. Each chapter ends with appendices analyzing the
relevant constitutional provisions and practices in the existing federations.
tProfessor of Law, University of Virginia.
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Despite the fact that the movement towards a European political community
received a severe check with the collapse of the EDC project in 1954, these
Studies (first published in French in Brussels in 1953) are a contribution to
the permanent literature of federalism. The worth of the volume is enhanced
by Professor Friedrich's valuable introduction discussing the movement towards
a European constitution, and by the bibliography of federalism with which it
concludes.
The volume edited by Professor 2'Iacmahon in the Columbia University
Bicentennial series consists of revised versions of papers presented at a con-
ference on federalism held in January 1954. It offers in its final section, en-
titled "Supranational Union in Western Europe," further and more up-to-
date versions of the views of both Professor Bowie and Professor Friedrich,
and in addition important chapters on the economic aspects of the unification
movement by Mr. William Diebold, Jr. and Professor Ing-var Svennilson of
Stockholm.
The final section of Federalism, Mature and Emergent includes as well a
chapter by Tom Charlton Clark on the early phases of the Schuman plan which,
while useful in itself, departs in tone from what one might expect in a work
published under such auspices. "[A] realism unusual for Europe"1 is not the
kind of phrase that commends itself to Europeans; nor was this perhaps the
occasion for arguing that "it is also time that U.S. foreign aid stop assisting
the development of an industrial self-sufficiency for each Western European
nation if at the same time one of its aims is to bring about a united Europe" ;2
or that "judged by the length of time it took to get the Schuman treaty into
operation . . . all other pooling ideas should get under way without delay." 3
Mr. Clark's enthusiasm for his subject can hardly have sufficed to convince all
his colleagues at the Conference that while the idea of national sovereignty
dies hard, "in one sense the Schuman Plan symbolizes that death," and there-
with "the birth of a new sovereignty concept-that of a United Europe.'
'
Ir. Clark might well have pondered the late Franz L. Neumann's criticism of
the assumption that federalism is the only conceivable form of political ad-
vance, in his paper "Federalism and Freedom: a Critique" ;5 or even more
appositely, Mr. John Fischer's well-informed essay "Prerequisites of Balance,"
which suggests "that the problem is more difficult than the casual American
observer might suspect; that the American pattern is not likely to produce a
wearable political garb for other peoples without a lot of tucks and patching;
and that the tailoring process may require a long time."
Indeed, looking at the intention of the volume as a whole, one regrets that
those responsible for the conference were unwilling or unable to provide more
representation from Europe itself. Apart from Professor Svennilson and from
1. FEDERALISm, MATURE AND EMERGENT 472.
2. Id. at 489.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 473.
5. Id.c. 3.
6. Id. at 67.
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Professor K. C. Wheare, who gave a lucid account of "Federalism and the
Making of Nations ' 7 in the light of Commonwealth experience, the partici-
pants were all Americans. One's regret stems, however, not so much from the
fact that European critics of federal "solutions" could have confronted Ameri-
can enthusiasts for them, as from the fact that it would have been good for
European enthusiasts to learn from the American experts on federalism in the
United States how far-removed is federalism as a going concern from the
simple institutional devices or allocations of powers that are all that consti-
tution-mongers can offer.
Unlike some composite works on topics of this kind, Federalism, Mature
and Emergent possesses a genuine unity of theme and presentation-largely
owing to the editorial skill of Professor Macmahon, whose introductory chap-
ters to each section admirably contrive to draw the student's attention to the
most significant points. The first section deals with the federal problem in a
general fashion and is perhaps chiefly notable for Professor A. A. Berle's
attempt to fit "evolving capitalism" into the framework of federal thinking.8
But the core of the book lies in part II, "Basic Controls in a Maturing Sys-
tem"; and part III, "Functional Channels of Relationship." Almost every
chapter of these sections, though of a different degree of generality, deserves
extended and critical treatment. And equally, each reveals the number of basic
assumptions upon which a working federal system rests: the political assump-
tion that in the last resort it is one nation whose affairs are being handled;
the professional assumption that each individual, whether his orbit be state or
federal, wants the system to work and is prepared to co-operate to that end,
as well as to safeguard the particular interests he is concerned with; and finally,
and perhaps most important, the personal assumption that the people con-
cerned speak the same language, share the same values, accept the same code
of conduct. One does not need to deny the reality of the cultural heritage that
the European peoples have in common, nor the existence of a European (as
opposed perhaps even to an American) way of life to doubt whether these
assumptions can hold good for a grouping even as geographically close as that
of the Schuman Plan countries.
If we must doubt the unspoken assumptions of those who urge a federal
government for Europe, we must equally resist being carried away by his-
torical arguments whose plausibility lies in their studied vagueness. Professor
Bowie writes, for instance: "It is a commonplace that Europe was united
before it became divided. Europe was Christendom, for a long time bound
together in theory, and even to some degree in fact, by the ties of Church and
Empire. It was the abode of a common Classic-Christian civilization. The
forces of the modern age shattered this unity at least in its political and eco-
nomic aspects." When one looks at this more closely, and asks when and over
what area was secular authority exercised by a single institution-and what
else can political unity mean?-it is difficult to see what answer Professor
7. Id. c. 2.
S. Id. c. 5.
9. Id. at 494-95.
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Bowie could give that would match his claim. Or again, what is meant by
economic unity attributed to an age when nearly all production was for local
markets and when such international trade as existed depended on the good-
will of a multitude of different, petty wielders of power?
The test of medieval political unity is not what some theorists in the ser-
vice of Pope or Emperor may have written, but rather how far either authority
could prevent the violence that has been endemic in social relations whenever
no common authority has existed to repress it. It was not an accident that the
growth of political unity in England was measured by the growth of the "King's
peace." So far from the conflicts of "a cluster of national states" having
brought war to Europe, no century in the Middle Ages was as peaceful as the
nineteenth century, by which time this cluster was full developed.
On the specific problems that the project of West European federation
raises, the degree of awareness is unequal as among the several contributors
to these volumes. Professor Macmahon points out the difficulty of discovering
where Europe begins and ends and urges elasticity: "The postponement of the
main question seems justified by the assumption that a galvanizing hope within
many minds in the eastern countries, going beyond mere relief from existing
regimes, is the thought of membership in a united Europe."' 0 Apart from the
abortive talks among the exiled governments in wartime London, there seems
little evidence for this assumption. Indeed, it would seem far more probable
that were the Russian incubus lifted the result would be a new outburst of
national passions.
A far more important problem is evoked by the reminder in Studies in
Federalism that the West German Basic Law provides already for the incor-
poration of East Germany into the Federal Republic as soon as it is free to
choose its own form of government."1 Assuming that East Germany desires
reunification with West Germany, would it not then come automatically into
any European federal scheme? And would this not vitally affect the balance
between France and Germany, which Mr. Fischer rightly sees as the heart of
the political problem ?12 It is true that the issue of the internal balance, so much
in the minds of the American Founding Fathers, has never been the dominant
one in the history of any other modern federation (except possibly in Imperial
and Weimar Germany), but no modern federation has started with such a legacy
of suspicion as would a European federation. Professor Friedrich may be
right when he says that the primary issue "is not internal but external security
and defence."'u But can we expect even the external issue to seem the same to
France and to Germany, even to a Germany united within the Oder-Neisse
frontier ?
Must we then agree with Professor Wheare that "there are no Euro-
peans" ?14 Certainly he is right if Britain is included in a definition of the
10. Id. at 410.
11. S un ms xx FEDERALIsm 756.
12. FEDERALism, MATURE AND EMERGENT 66.
13. Id. at 520.
14. Id. at 40.
[Vol. 65
REVIEWS
European community; yet it is difficult to believe in the promise of European
institutions from which Britain (and with her Scandinavia) stands aloof. And
even within such institutions as she can work with there is, as Professor Mac-
mahon shows, the still unsolved difference between the OEEC and the Stras-
bourg approach, between an open and a closed economic system for Europe.
Hence the whole question of the general economic policy of any inclusive
federation would be wide open; and there would remain the inherent tendency
towards protectionism by the units-which, as is shown in Studies in Federal-
ism, is almost universal. The price of maintaining a common market would be
eternal vigilance and perhaps coercion: could such a federation stand it?
Obviously much of the effectiveness of a federation would depend on the
formation of a class of administrators who would put the federation first in
their loyalties. The Schuman Plan has provided some encouragement in this
respect, but as things grew would not more come to rest on questions of lan-
guage and basic training? How much importance should we give to the fact
that in 1947, not a single Canadian government department was headed by a
French-Canadian, despite the fact that the Cabinet as well as the legislature is
a federal one ?"; Or to the very one-sided meaning that Canadian practice gives
to the notion bilingual-where French Canadians need English but the English
Canadians need no French?16
The authors of Study V in Studies in Federalism take a very high line about
the difficulty of permitting individual members of a federation to belong to in-
ternational organizations in their own right, suggesting that they should be
replaced by the federal government and that they should in fact have no in-
ternational contacts other than on matters reserved to their jurisdiction. This
suggestion goes much further than the relevant part III, chapter III of the
Draft Treaty. On the other hand, it is difficult to gainsay the wisdom of the
proposal, in view of the difficulties that both Canada and the United States
have experienced with international conventions despite their relatively tight-
knit structures. In his essay in Federalism, Mature and Emergent,17 Pro-
fessor Noel T. Dowling takes the view that it is only the Executive's policy,
and not its power, that is affected by internal disagreements in the case of the
United States, and that all is well so long as the President appreciates that
one of the duties of which he must be aware when negotiating internationally
is that of preserving the federal system. In a relatively mature political society,
this may be so-though Senator Bricker would dissent-but the executive of
a European federation would hardly be entrusted with such extensive foreign
relations powers as is the American President, nor be able to wield them if he
were. It looks as though, whatever the internal merits of the scheme, the pro-
posed federation would be an uncomfortable member of the society of nations.
On the economic side, we have the powerful argument by Professor Sven-
nilson that one cannot effectively limit economic integration to a multiplication
15. STUDIES IN FnEmamsm 76.
16. Id. at 93.
17. C. 3.
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of Schuman-type "pools": "In my view, the realization of the fundamental
importance of the payments problems lays bare the sine qua non without
which all work on economic integration is rather futile: If countries are not
prepared to coordinate their whole economic policy, all integration will stop
half-way. ' 18 And this is reinforced by the strong plea in Studies in Fedcral-
ism that full powers over currency and credit be vested in the federal govern-
ment;19 there must, in other words, be an acceptance by all the participant
states of the principle of mutual responsibility for economic welfare-defined,
presumably, as full employment at rising standards. Mr. William Diebold
argues that "a federation may function satisfactorily in spite of considerable
diversity of conditions in its parts. ' 20 The federation itself may also under
certain conditions aid in diminishing such diversity: in the United States
"in the decade ending in 1951 the spread between the states with the highest
and lowest per capita income dropped from the ratio of 1:4.8 to 1:2.7."21
This is not so far from the Italian-Belgian ratio of 1:2.3. But will the policies
of levelling be accepted so readily in a European federation as they were in
the United States?
Both an institutional and a functional approach to the problem of balancing
the powers of the federal state and its component states are offered by the
essays on American experience in federalism. On the one hand, there is
the constitutional division of powers between the states and the federal
government, and the question of its judicial interpretation. Here considera-
tion of historical experience, particularly that of the antebellum decade in the
United States, and the current "segregation" issue suggests to Professor Paul
A. Freund the question "whether the pragmatic institution of judicial review
is possible in a federal system only where deep philosophic cleavages do not
exist."'22 On the other hand, more illuminating still is the approach from the
functional side. In dealing with labor relations,m Professor Paul R. Hays
shows Congress to be ready to devolve upon the states powers that the Su-
preme Court is willing that Congress should itself exercise exclusively. Political
tact can thus on occasion do more than law to keep the balance healthy.
Professor Macmahon shows 2 4 how much is in fact done by methods of
collaboration on both the vertical (state-federal) and horizontal (inter-state)
axes, and how one level may invest the other with powers for the sake of
convenience. The extent to which this has been done has differed over differ-
ent historical periods. There has been no one-way shift towards the center, as
Professor John M. Gaus shows in his chapter on agricultural policy and
adminstration.2 5 In an essay on "Decision-Making in a Federal System" 20
18. FEDERALISit, MATURE AND Ei ERGENT 467.
19. STUDIES IN FEDmALiSu 422.
20. FEDERALISm, MATURE AND EMRRGENT 454.
21. Id. at 275.
22. Id. at 171.
23. Id. c. 12.
24. Id. c. 14.
25. Id. c. 15.
26. Id. c. 19.
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Professor Edward W. Weidner argues (in a manner that would have been
made more convincing if some sociological jargon had been pruned) that in
the United States actual clashes between the federal government and the states
have been rare indeed; and in his chapter on trade regulation,27 Professor
Milton Handler argues that federalism can do the job, with an optimism that
Professor Macmahon himself finds rather overdone.
2 8
Scepticism about the applicability of the American experience to Europe
arises not so much because this optimism may be misplaced or because more
weight should be given to other fields where experience has been less happy,
29
but rather because the success of a federal system depends, as -has been said,
on certain unstated assumptions to which one more may be added: that the
system is one which has grown up over the decades, and with which a nation
has grown up, so that each person within it, whether representing the state or
the federal government, knows on the whole how far his particular allegiance
will allow him to go. To echo Chief Justice Marshall, it is a constitution,
not a treaty, they are working.
Both the volumes under consideration have been prepared with obvious
care, the more remarkable in view of the shortness of time available to the
authors of Studies in Federalism. Errors of fact are gratifyingly rare. It is
perhaps going too far to suggest that Mr. John Fischer's revival of the "safety-
valve theory" of the American frontier comes under this head; but it is
scarcely historically accurate or practically helpful to say "when a factory
worker felt intolerably oppressed, he did not plot revolution; he simply moved
beyond the Alleghenies and took to farming free land."30 Professor Berle
would have been on even stronger ground if he had noted that it was not
four but thirteen months after election that a new Congress used to meet. 31
The difficulties of European constitution-making would have been even greater
had Luxembourg's population only been 70,000 as Professor Friedrich has it,
instead of 300,000.32 The election of a President has fallen to the House of
Representatives in the United States only twice, not "several times. '33 The
statement that in Australia "the State Cabinets communicate directly with the
British Colonial Office in such questions as the appointment of State governors
and changes to State Constitutions"3 4 can hardly be sustained. The Colonial
Office has no role in relation to the fully self-governing members of the Com-
monwealth. The Governors of Australian states are appointed by the Queen
on the advice of her ministers in the United Kingdom who consult with the
27. Id. c. 18.
28. Id. at 296.
29. Professor Charles McKinley can find little that is encouraging in American
federalism's record in the field of conservation and is strongly hostile to the quasi-federal-
ism of the proposed Missouri River interstate compact with its provision for equal repre-
sentation of all participants. Id. c. 16.
30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at 70.
32. STUDIES IN FEDERALISM p. XXX.
33. d. at 11.
34. Id. at 272.
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Premier of the state. Again, it is not the Foreign Office but the Common-
wealth Relations Office that deals with the Commonwealth government on
matters concerning the federation as a whole.35 The chronology of the Seces-
sion movement in the United States on the eve of the Civil War has got
curiously tangled up.36 The decision of the United Kingdom Parliamentary
Select Committee not to receive Western Australia's petition to secede did
did not so much deny "the right of secession in either Canada or Australia" as
make it plain that it could not be done by one state or province acting on
its own.37 It is true that there is no document explicitly recognizing the right
of a member of the Commonwealth to secede from it; but there are a number
of authoritative statements which make that right absolutely clear, at least
since 1949. Similarly, although no right of withdrawal is included in the
United Nations Charter, the San Francisco Conference adopted a "Declara-
tion of Withdrawal" which put the right effectively on record.
MAx BELorFt
ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION 1948-1951. By Emanuel Rackman. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 196. $3.00.
RABBI Rackman, a member of the Faculty of Political Science at Yeshiva
University, has written a very timely study of the difficulties that faced the
political leaders of the new State of Israel in the task of drafting and adopting
a written constitution. It should prove of great interest and value not only to
specialists in Jewish history and culture but also to those students of the broad
subject of comparative constitutional law who are concerned with the practical
problem of implementing democratic principles and forms of government in
newly independent and self-governing countries.
One special feature of constitution-making in the new State of Israel. in com-
parison to similar experiments in, say, Ireland, India, or Pakistan,' is the avail-
ability of an extraordinarily broad and varied body of jurisprudential experi-
ence-a consequence of the immigration during the postwar years of vast num-
bers of refugees and displaced persons from most of the European countries
and even from Asia and Africa. It is indicative of the high quality of technical
skill and the wide range of legal backgrounds available to the Israeli govern-
ment that the first draft of a constitution was the work of a former German
constitutional lawyer, Dr. Leo Kohn, who years before had assisted in similar
work for the government of Ireland, then newly independent from the United
Kingdom and looking around, in the inevitable reaction against all things Eng-
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 764-66.
37. Id. at 766.
tNuffield Reader in the Comparative Study of Institutions, University of Oxford.
1. See, generally, McWhinney, The Courts and the Constitution in Catholic Ireland,
29 TUL. L. RV. 69 (1954) ; Denmocratic Constitutionalism in South-East Asia-Constitu-
tion-making in. India, Ceylon and Pakistan, 1 Howam L.J. 149 (1955).
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